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THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN
O’BANNON AND THE FALLACY OF
FRAGILE DEMAND
ANDY SCHWARZ* & RICHARD J. VOLANTE**

First of all, under the Rule of Reason, in this Court and in the
Supreme Court, to be valid, a restraint need only be
reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competitive ends.
So . . . the question is whether the NCAA’s rule of no pay for
play—none—is so inconsistent with its objective of
preserving amateur athletics that it violates the Rule
[of Reason].1
With these words, NCAA counsel Seth Waxman succeeded in diverting the
Ninth Circuit majority in O’Bannon v. NCAA2 from its actual task,
enforcing the antitrust laws. Instead, after having determined the NCAA was a
cartel in restraint of trade and liable under the Sherman Act,3 the court chose to
take on the role of the enforcement arm of the NCAA, focused on
preserving amateurism rather than preserving competition.
This error was not lost on the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit Judge
Sidney Thomas who explained in dissent
* Andy Schwarz (@andyhre on Twitter) is an antitrust economist and partner at OSKR, an economic
consulting firm specializing in expert witness testimony. He managed the economic research for Defendants in Raiders v. NFL and for Plaintiffs in O’Bannon v. NCAA.
** Richard J. Volante, Esq. (@EssexAce13 on Twitter) is a sports and entertainment agent and
consultant at Sixth City Sports & Entertainment, LLC, a consultation and representation firm. Additionally, Ricky is admitted to the Ohio Bar and recently co-founded Victor & Volante, Co., a firm that
focuses on sports and entertainment law.
1. Oral Argument at 16:05, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (No.
14-16601), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000007396.
2. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1076 (“But in finding that paying students cash compensation would
promote amateurism as effectively as not paying them, the district court ignored that not paying
student-athletes is precisely what makes them amateurs.”).
3. Id. at 1079 (“Today, we reaffirm that NCAA regulations are subject to antitrust scrutiny and must
be tested in the crucible of the Rule of Reason. . . . In this case, the NCAA’s rules have been more
restrictive than necessary to maintain its tradition of amateurism in support of the college sports
market.”).
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The majority characterizes our task at step three of the Rule of
Reason as determining “whether the alternative of allowing
students to be paid NIL compensation unrelated to their
education expenses is ‘virtually as effective’ in preserving
amateurism as not allowing compensation.” This conclusion
misstates our inquiry. Rather, we must determine whether
allowing student-athletes to be compensated for their NILs is
‘virtually as effective’ in preserving popular demand for
college sports as not allowing compensation. In terms of
antitrust analysis, the concept of amateurism is relevant only
insofar as it relates to consumer interest.4
This confusion—between restraints that promote “amateurism” and those
that promote competition by allowing a product to exist at all, particularly one
that meets consumer demand but could not exist without the restraint—is at the
heart of the NCAA’s now sixty years of successful price fixing (dating back to
1956). These efforts were, ironically, given a substantial boost when the NCAA
lost the NCAA v. Board of Regents5 case (the first of a trilogy of cases that found
the NCAA to be an anticompetitive price-fixing cartel6). In essence, the NCAA
argues (without a proffer of market-based evidence) that amateurism is unable
to stand on its own in the marketplace and that rules that provide for collective
punishments, including full-on boycotts, are necessary for the product to exist,
and therefore the specific rules that define amateurism are immune from
antitrust scrutiny. What matters, argues the NCAA, as to the legality of a
particular restraint is not whether it provides a sine qua non without which
college sports (or even amateur college sports) could not exist, but rather
whether the rule in suit is a reasonable ancillary restraint to preserve, not
competition or even the product in question, but amateurism itself, as the NCAA
defines (and continually redefines) it.
Neither this confusion nor efforts to bring it into the light as a
sophisticated but sophistic ruse is new. In 2000, Rascher and Schwarz explained
There is a subtlety here that seems to have been missed by
later interpreters of NCAA v. Board of Regents. In essence, the
4. Id. at 1081 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). NIL stands for name, image, and likeness.
Id. at 1055.
5. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
6. The other two being O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049 and Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir.
1998).
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NCAA Court said one thing: academic affiliation is what
differentiates NCAA football from NFL football, and thus
creates a market—i.e., this differentiation is procompetitive.
The Court then went on to assume that a particular restraint
used to achieve that differentiation—amateurism—is both
reasonable and necessary. In NCAA, there was no need to
determine if amateurism was actually a reasonable and
necessary restraint; the Court merely sought to highlight the
comparative lack of justification for the NCAA’s TV
restraints.
However, in later cases, particularly McCormack v. NCAA,
Gaines v. NCAA, and Banks v. NCAA, the courts have used
NCAA v. Board of Regents as a starting point, reading
Supreme Court dicta as evidence that amateurism itself has
passed the reasonableness test, moving forward to evaluate
specific follow-on rules designed to support amateurism.
These cases analyze whether the NCAA’s rules are reasonable
and necessary for preserving amateurism, not if amateurism itself is reasonable and necessary. Since NCAA did not perform
this formal analysis (because this question did not apply to the
matter at hand), it remains an open issue for the courts.7
As a simple example of this difference, consider the so-called Sanity Code,
by which the NCAA banned all scholarship aid in 1948 in the name of
amateurism. Under a proper Rule of Reason analysis (had one been performed
prior to the restraint collapsing through schools’ refusal to enforce the
collective boycotts),8 the question would be whether a strict and blanket
prohibition on all form of scholarship aid whatsoever9 was necessary to
produce college sports. Almost certainly such an answer would have been (and
would still be) no, as no such rule existed during the rise of college
football as a popular sport (far more popular than the NFL prior to World War
7. Daniel A. Rascher & Andrew D. Schwarz, Neither Reasonable Nor Necessary: “Amateurism”
in Big-Time College Sports, ANTITRUST, Spring 2000, at 51 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
8. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust
Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 332–34 (2007) (noting that the Sanity Code only existed for
approximately two years before being abandoned and eventually replaced by a form of the NCAA’s
current bylaws).
9. Gary T. Brown, NCAA Answers Call to Reform: The ‘Sanity Code’ Leads Association down Path
to Enforcement Program, NCAA.ORG (Nov. 22, 1999), http://fs.ncaa.org/Docs/NCAANewsArchive/1999/19991122/active/3624n24.html.
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II10). However, from the NCAA’s position, the question is not whether “sanity”
was needed to produce college sports, but whether “sanity” was a reasonably
necessary means of ensuring that amateurism existed, regardless of whether
amateurism itself was necessary to produce college sports.
From the perspective of 2015, with the Sanity Code gone for over sixty
years, it may seem ludicrous that a court might be asked to rule in favor of a
restraint prohibiting all scholarship aid, under the theory that if the NCAA feels
it is necessary to preserve amateurism, no further inquiry is needed.
Ludicrous or not, the NCAA in fact did ask the Ninth Circuit to rule as such, as
argued again by Counsel Seth Waxman:
As a thought exercise, think of what would happen, let’s
assume . . . the NCAA goes back and says . . . we are simply
going to require the Division-III model or the Ivy League model
of all schools. That is, students get in, we can try to recruit
athletes, but no one gets any athletic scholarships. You get
scholarships based on need, if the school has sufficient
resources to provide it. Under the Plaintiffs’ theory in this case
and I think under the district judge’s rationale that would be a
violation of the antitrust laws . . . The point is, that this is a
product, it’s again, I think no one would contend, that if the
NCAA just decided that we’re not going to offer athletic
scholarships, which is the rule that existed in 1906 when the
rules were first permitted, and instead we’re simply going to
endorse the rules that we have for Division III, that that would
be a violation of the antitrust laws.11
To those aware of this dichotomy between truly procompetitive restraints
that preserve competition and seemingly unjustified restraints that merely
perpetuate the abuse of monopsony power under the guise of amateurism,
O’Bannon provided an ideal testing ground for whether the antitrust laws would
function to protect competition or to preserve the NCAA’s cartel power.
The result of this test, to date, is incomplete.12 The Ninth Circuit majority
10. The quick rise in popularity of the NFL can be traced back to the 1958 NFL Championship
Game between the Baltimore Colts and New York Giants, which led to the league quickly surpassing
college football in terms of national popularity. See MICHAEL MACCAMBRIDGE, AMERICA’S GAME:
THE EPIC STORY OF HOW PRO FOOTBALL CAPTURED A NATION ix–xix (2004). Perhaps not
coincidentally, this rise coincided in time with the first period of NCAA enforcement of amateurism
that began in 1956.
11. Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 7:31.
12. Indeed, while this Article was in final proofs, both the O’Bannon Plaintiffs and the NCAA have
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(with agreement on this point by the dissent) found that the challenged NCAA
rules were “patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary to accomplish all
of its procompetitive objectives”13 and therefore upheld the district court’s
ruling that “the NCAA’s amateurism rules . . . were an illegal restraint of trade
under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”14 However, the majority of the
court stopped short of allowing the NCAA’s amateurism rules to fall by the
wayside, arguing “that it is a ‘self-evident fact’ that ‘[t]he difference between
offering student-athletes education-related compensation and offering them
cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum
leap.’”15 In essence, the majority appears to have decided that consumers will
not purchase college sports if they are seen as non-amateur.16 No evidence was
presented for this claim, and as the dissent pointed out, much evidence to the
contrary was first declared inapt or explained away by the majority before it
could declare these truths to be self-evident.17
In contrast to this muddy legal picture, the economics are quite clear.
Underpinning the application of the Rule of Reason to team sports is the
simple truism that it takes more than one team to field a competitive sport
contest.18 Once coordination between two teams, likely economic competitors
off-the-field (in some markets), is recognized as necessary for those teams to
become sports competitors on-the-field, the normal legal standard against
agreements among competitors to regulate output clearly must be modified for
sports.19 The result was a series of cases, primarily in the 1980s and early 1990s,
recognizing that per se bans on restraints governing sports franchises risk
banning procompetitive conduct.20 Thus, the actual holding of NCAA v. Board
of Regents (as opposed to the now rejected reading of its amateurism dicta)
stood for the idea that the Rule of Reason was a more appropriate standard for
appealed to the Supreme Court.
13. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
14. Id. at 1055–56.
15. Id. at 1081 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in original).
16. Id. at 1078–79.
17. See id. at 1080–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ninth Circuit cases
comprised 25.7% of all Supreme Court cases during the last four terms and were overturned 79.5% of
the time. Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg Law): Scoring the
Circuits, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2014, 10:28 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/scotus-forlaw-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-scoring-the-circuits/.
18. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL (Raiders I), 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating a per se rule was inappropriate due to “the unique nature of the business of professional
football.”).
19. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010).
20. See, e.g., Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 1992); Raiders I, 726
F.2d 1381, 1387; McNeil v. NFL, 790 F. Supp. 871, 897 (D. Minn. 1992).
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assessing whether agreements among universities as to the details of how they
produce college sports than would be a per se prohibition of all discussion of
price or output. But despite this recognition, the major sports leagues (with the
obvious exception of baseball)21 as well as college sports have all been found
liable for violations of the Sherman Act under the Rule of Reason. Particularly
with respect to conduct as it relates to fixing the price of talent, cases like
Robertson v. NBA,22 McNeil v. NFL,23 and Law v. NCAA24 firmly established
that collective restraints on pay, when imposed outside of a valid collective
bargaining framework, are illegal restraints of trade, even under the Rule of
Reason standard.
An important economic grounding for why such a legal framework makes
sense is the idea that prices in a specialized labor market are typically set, not
by supply and cost factors but rather by demand factors. That is because the
cost to produce a football player or even an assistant coach is fairly low relative
to the competitive wage an athlete or coach can earn and is usually substantially
higher than the athlete or coach’s second-best wage offer outside of sports. As
a matter of economics, it is clear that what is driving up the price of talent is
demand.
This boils down to a simple first year undergraduate economic concept,
namely the difference between movement along a demand curve, caused by a
change in the cost of supply, versus movement of a demand curve, caused by
the increased value of the product to its purchasers. The former has the potential
to cause reduction in output—as prices rise for factors unrelated to demand, the
least valuable product may find itself without a buyer willing to pay its now
higher price.
21. [T]his Court held that the business of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs
of professional baseball players was not within the scope of federal antitrust laws. Congress has had
the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by
legislation having prospective effect.
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953) (referring to Justice Holmes’s 1922 majority
opinion in Federal Baseball Club of Balt. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922)). See generally City of San Jose v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, 776 F.3d 686 (2015),
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 36 (2015) (upholding MLB’s antitrust exemption).
22. Robertson v. NBA, 556 F.2d 682, 686 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977) (establishing free agency in the NBA,
with the court stating that the non-statutory labor exemption, or CBA exemption, did not apply to
unilateral employer actions, but rather only joint actions of the employers and union).
23. McNeil, 790 F. Supp. at 888–89 (finding Plan B free agency to be more restrictive than
necessary after it failed two of the three Mackey test prongs and thereby not protected under the
non-statutory labor exemption, which led to a settlement with the league creating a salary cap and free
agency in the NFL).
24. See generally Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit determined
the restricted earning coaches cap violated antitrust law and was not exempted by Board of Regents.
Id. at 1018–19.
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Higher-Cost Supply Curve

Original Supply Curve

PNew

POld

Demand Curve
QNew

QOld

Quantity

Increase in Cost Leads to a Shift in Supply, Raising Price While
Lowering Quantity
But the latter, a situation in which demand itself drives up price, the idea
that purchasers will find these new prices unaffordable is economic nonsense—
the prices have risen only because consumer demand has grown. The result,
eminently natural to economists but seemingly contradictory to some lay folk,
is one in which price and output rise.
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Supply Curve
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Higher Demand Curve

POld

Original Demand Curve
QOld

QNew

Quantity

Increased Consumer Interest Leads to a Shift in Demand,
Raising Price and Quantity
What sort of economic phenomenon would involve an increase in
demand? Imagine a wonderful world in which cinnamon powdered donuts were
found to have cancer-fighting properties, so that instead of chemotherapy,
certain cancers could be treated with a daily dose of donuts—and moreover,
sufficient proactive donut consumption could stop cancer before it starts. One
can easily see that the desire of consumers to purchase donuts would rise, even
in the face of a price increase, simply because as wonderful as these little
powdered gems may be today, adding in the additional benefit of curing cancer
would surely grow their popularity.25
This effect is similar to what happens when artificially capped demand is
set free (e.g., by ending collusion). Price rises, not because the cost of supply
changed, but because effective demand has grown.
With this in mind, it should be clear that rational sports franchises really
cannot drive up the price of talent to the point where no one can afford to
purchase it. Even if, for example, the richest team in the NFL wants to pay its
head coach $50 million per year, the ability for that price to drive the price of

25. One of the Authors is currently on a strict no-sugar diet, which may be responsible for the paean
to cinnamon donuts above.

SCHWARZ_VOLANTE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

6/15/2016 4:39 PM

O’BANNON & FALLACY OF FRAGILE DEMAND

399

the thirty-second coach to the point that the thirty-second team cannot afford his
salary would require some other source of demand for that coach’s services.
Into this basic economic framework comes the NCAA’s idea that if athletes
are allowed to be paid a market price, the product of college sports would cease
to exist. Clearly, economically, this idea is false. At a basic level, if demand
(D) for college sports is a function of the level of payment (w) and level of
quality (q), that is, 𝐷 = 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑞), and if that function is decreasing for values of
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
w above some magical threshold w*, that is, 𝑑𝑤 <0 for w>w*, then payments
above the optimal level of wage will be prevented organically, by the simple
fact that rational firms do not voluntarily undertake demand-decreasing
purchases.
Such a market would have a relationship between compensation and
consumer demand that followed the following schedule, where demand grows
as compensation increases (from D-III in which athletes themselves pay to play,
through D-II and FCS football) to the point of supposed maximum
popularity, the FBS limits, after which, according to the NCAA, demand would
begin to decline:

Demand for Football

Hypothesized Point at which
America stops loving college football

FCS

FBS

Path if hypothesis is false and
demand unaffected by pay

D-II

Path if hypothesis true and
demand decreases with pay

D-III
Compensation to Athletes

Going beyond this point requires costly investments that yield negative
returns. Only an irrational or incompetent firm would take such steps. Thus no
collective action would be needed to prevent an NFL team from installing sharp
spikes on every seat in its stadium—the process would increase costs and at the
same time decrease attendance. If payments to athletes above some level are
demand decreasing, they would be as likely to happen absent a government
mandate as a costly spike-installation process.
This is the economic fallacy behind the Ninth Circuit majority’s opinion in
O’Bannon. The Ninth Circuit explained:
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The difference between offering student-athletes
education-related compensation and offering them cash sums
untethered to educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum
leap. Once that line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to
a rule of amateurism and no defined stopping point; we have
little doubt that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the
arbitrary limit imposed by the district court until they have
captured the full value of their NIL. At that point the NCAA
will have surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and
transitioned from its “particular brand of football” to minor
league status. In light of that, the meager evidence in the record,
and the Supreme Court’s admonition that we must afford the
NCAA “ample latitude” to superintend college athletics, we
think it is clear the district court erred in concluding that small
payments in deferred compensation are a substantially less
restrictive alternative restraint. We thus vacate that portion of
the district court’s decision and the portion of its injunction
requiring the NCAA to allow its member schools to pay this
deferred compensation.26
Under the Rule of Reason, if there is “no basis” for payments to stop at
some arbitrary level that defines amateurism, but instead consumer demand will
drive teams to pay athletes “until they have captured the full value of their
NIL,”27 then, as a matter of economics, any arbitrary limit is inherently
unnecessary. Rather than laying out an argument for why a strict, collectively
enforced rule defining amateurism was necessary to preserve consumer
demand, the majority in O’Bannon expressed a fear that consumer demand
would prove rules enforcing NCAA-style amateurism were themselves
unnecessary.28 After all, what industry in the history of American business has
ever voluntarily incurred higher costs with the known goal of lowering
consumers’ evaluation of the product’s quality? The very idea that athletes have
a full value of their NIL that is currently being denied to them is evidence that
the restraint of cost of attendance (COA) is too low, because that full value is
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
only set in the context of consumer demand. If
<0 at w=COA, then there
𝑑𝑤
is no risk of pay rising higher in a less constrained market. On the contrary, if
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
>0 at w=COA, then if left unconstrained, pay will rise to the full value
𝑑𝑤
26. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2015) (footnotes omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101–02, 120 (1984)).
27. Id.
28. See id.
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of NIL and consumer demand will be enhanced.

Demand for Football / Profit

The actual, organic “defined stopping point”

COA
FCS

FBS

Consumer Demand

D-II

D-III

Terra Incognita

Just as in the examples above, if payment rises for reasons driven by
demand, rules designed to restrain that increase are almost certainly
anticompetitive as a matter of economics.
Recall that the majority found the NCAA’s actual rule, which limited
scholarships to what was then known as a Full Grant-in-Aid (GIA) (several
thousand dollars below full COA)29 were “more restrictive than necessary”30
and thus violated the Sherman Act. But, argued the majority, the COA line
could not be crossed without making a “quantum leap.”31 Of course, in 1948,
the NCAA argued this quantum leap was at $1 in aid, not at COA. And in 2006,
when sued over COA issues in White v. NCAA, the NCAA argued that a rule
allowing schools to pay the full COA for athletic aid was itself on the wrong
side of the quantum leap line.32 The idea that (a) the next dollar
29. Each university independently determines the list price of the components of a Full GIA as well
as its official COA values. Jon Solomon, 2015-16 CBS Sports FBS College Football Cost of
Attendance Database, CBSSPORTS (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/25275374/-16-cbs-sports-fbs-college-football-cost-of-attendance-database.
For example, Alabama is able to offer up to $5,386 in addition to the traditional elements of a GIA
(room, board, books, tuition, and fees), while Ohio State is only able to offer up to $2,970. Id.
30. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075, 1079 (stating “[t]o the contrary, the evidence at trial showed that
the grant-in-aid cap has no relation whatsoever to the procompetitive purposes of the NCAA: by the
NCAA’s own standards, student-athletes remain amateurs as long as any money paid to them goes to
cover legitimate educational expenses.”).
31. See id. at 1078.
32. In October 2007, the NCAA argued prohibiting COA was necessary to “prevent ‘pay-for-play’;
ensure that student-athletes are students first; protect the NCAA’s unique, amateur model of
competition for the benefit of consumers and student-athletes.” See NCAA’s Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Support of Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment, at
40, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06–0999–RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066803 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2007).
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beyond COA would destroy demand and that (b) schools would knowingly
make that quantum leap remains an untested assumption.33 As the dissent in
O’Bannon explained, “After an extensive bench trial, the district court made a
factual finding that payment of $5,000 in deferred compensation would not
significantly reduce consumer demand for college sports. This finding was
supported by extensive testimony from at least four expert witnesses. There was
no evidence to the contrary.”34
However, purely arguendo, suppose the majority in the Ninth Circuit has
sua sponte unearthed some magical property of demand that applies to college
sports and to no other market, which is that as long as consumers feel someone
is minding the store to ensure “sanity” or amateurism, consumer demand is safe,
but that if consumers feel some school is cheating, then the entire system will
collapse. Surely then, one might ask whether the NCAA must step in to prevent
schools from crossing that mystical line of demarcation, beyond which market
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
collapse looms? That is, 𝑑𝑤 >0 for all w<=COA, and then there is some
as-yet-unproven discontinuity, such that 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑞) = 0 for all w > COA.
Though a demand curve like this sounds somewhat improbable, there are
consumer markets in which bad apples can spoil the whole bunch. For example,
consider the market for organic fruit, in which organic apples, which cost more
to produce and may look somewhat less appealing on the shelf, are nevertheless
in high demand by a segment of consumers, and where that demand will drop
to close to zero if the apples are produced non-organically. In the absence of
some form of market regulation, there is little to stop an unscrupulous apple
orchard from using pesticides and other tools of the non-organic trade, but
labeling the resulting product as “organic” simply to tap into the higher
consumer demand that such a sticker can drive. Much like the market for used
cars in which lemons35 drive out quality cars,36 cheaper faux-ganic fruit can
They had previously argued that “the NCAA will explain during summary judgment briefing why
Plaintiffs’ proposed ‘COA cap’ is not a viable, let alone less restrictive, means of achieving the procompetitive benefits that the NCAA’s current financial aid rules provide.” Defendant NCAA’s Reply
in Support of Its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, at 7–8, n.9, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06–0999–
RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066803 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2007). While White ultimately settled, the settlement (Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Defendant National Collegiate
Athletic Association, White v. NCAA, Case No. 2:06-cv-00999, 2008 WL 890625 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 28,
2008)) did not include any change in the NCAA’s maximum GIA rules, and thus COA remained prohibited until 2015.
33. Mark Emmert, the president of the NCAA, stated, “If we move toward a pay-for-play model –
if we were to convert our student-athletes to employees of the university – that would be the death of
college athletics.” Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html.
34. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1083 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. Apologies for having created a fruit salad of mixed metaphors.
36. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
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drive out truly organic fruit and leave consumers worse off.
Organic fruit can be thought of as a form of amateurism—although
perhaps not produced to the same level of mainstream, commercially defined
quality as other fruit—one for which the specific characteristics that make it
organic are essential to its consumer appeal. If the NCAA and the Ninth Circuit
majority in O’Bannon are correct, amateurism is like this as well; when
detached from the product itself, demand has (arguendo) the potential to drop
to zero.
However, there is no need to ban commercially produced fruit to ensure
organic fruit can survive. The solution is not to let all orchards collude to expel
any non-organic producers, but rather to establish truth-in-labeling standards.
This distinction is illustrative for college sports because the concept that
demand hinges on a magical line across which all demand perishes is similar.
Almost certainly, the taste buds of organic-seeking consumers would not
explode if non-organic food crossed their lips, but their demand function might
collapse. And so, the legal remedy emerges by which standards are imposed,
either by law or by voluntary associations of organic growers (playing a role
much like that of the NCAA) to assure the public that the organic fruit on this
side of the aisle truly merits the label “organic” while the fruit on side of the
aisle, without such a sticker, may be cheaper, rosier, etc., but is not organic.
Under the Rule of Reason, if the organic standards solve an economic
problem, such that without coordination, the organic fruit market might
collapse, then this is the quintessence of procompetitiveness. And to the casual
observer, the NCAA might seem perfectly analogous to such an organization,
voluntarily organizing producers of organic or “amateur” products to ensure
consumers know what they are getting and to let them choose among options,
secure in the knowledge that their amateur college sports are not really
professional sports in disguise.
But this view is incorrect, and it stems from (a) the insistence on a collective
boycott by the NCAA of any college team that would deviate from the standard
and (b) the presumption that amateur and college are perfect synonyms and that
therefore college and professional are perfect antonyms.
THE NEED FOR STANDARDS IS NOT A NEED FOR BOYCOTTS
The organic fruit metaphor helps cut through the first issue quite cleanly.
Organic fruit likely needs a body to inspect and certify the product as truly
organic. It does not require a pledge that no supermarket that wishes to sell
organic fruit also sells non-organic fruit. It does not impose penalties on those
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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orchards or orchard corporate parents that sell some organic and some
non-organic fruit. And it does not prevent orchards that are organic from
conducting business with those that are not. But the NCAA does prohibit such
conduct, so that its rules combine to expel a member from the association,37 to
terminate all rights and privileges,38 and most egregiously, to mandate a
collective boycott combined with a mandatory collective boycott by all other
members, even in a scrimmage or exhibition.39
A related way to conceptualize the system of compensation cap and
boycott is that the NCAA and its member schools have created a joint license,
combining their own intellectual property with that of the players in its
broadcasts. The question of a group license was of course central to O’Bannon.
The district court focused on competition across individual groups and found
that competition there was unchanged by the creation of a joint license.
While Plaintiffs have shown that the NCAA’s challenged rules
harm student-athletes by depriving them of compensation that
they would otherwise receive, they have not shown that this
harm results from a restraint on competition in the group
licensing market. In particular, they have failed to show that the
challenged rules hinder competition among any potential
buyers or sellers of group licenses.
The sellers in this market would be the student-athletes.
Plaintiffs have not presented any evidence to show that, in the
absence of the challenged restraint, teams of student-athletes
would actually compete against one another to sell their group
licenses.40
However, in the context of a certification organization, the loss of
competition driven by the NCAA’s (and its member schools and conferences’)
37. See 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art 19.9.7 (2015). “Additional Penalties for Level I
and Level II Violations. In addition to the core penalties for Level I and Level II violations, the panel
may prescribe one or more of the following penalties: . . . (e) Recommendation that the institution’s
membership in the Association be suspended or terminated pursuant to Constitution 3.2.5[.]” Id.
38. See id. art 3.2.5.1.1. “Cessation of Rights and Privileges. All rights and privileges of the member
shall cease upon any termination or suspension of active membership.” Id.
39. See id. art 3.2.4.10. “Discipline of Members. Pursuant to directions of the Board of Directors
or the annual [Convention], active members shall refrain from athletics competition with designated
institutions as required under the provisions of the Association’s infractions process (see Bylaw 19).”
Id.
40. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 994–95 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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insistence on exclusivity becomes more apparent. An instructive analogy can
be found in the consent decrees established by the Department of Justice (DOJ)
to govern performing rights organizations (PROs) such as the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)41 or Broadcast Music, Inc.
(BMI).42 The decrees encourage competition between the PROs to entice
licensees and engage new members through the offering of non-exclusive
licenses—the members maintain the right to individually license their work,
though not to another PRO. The DOJ felt it necessary to create these decrees
and subsequent rate systems to protect the artists from the PROs and balance
the leverage between the parties at the table.
While not governed by a consent decree like ASCAP and BMI, the
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC) agreed to a
settlement with the Television Music License Committee (TMLC) worth over
$58 million to alter its market-restricting conduct.43 The settlement stipulates
that over the next twenty years, SESAC must offer alternatives to the blanket
licenses that were only offered previously and allow their affiliates to directly
enter licensing agreements with local stations, amongst other “forward-looking
conduct restrictions.”44
That is, in the case of PROs, the efficiency of creating a bundled license is
balanced against the anticompetitive side effects that come from the removal of
competitive offers among members of the group bundle. Analogously, the
efficiency involved in conceiving the NCAA as a certification organization is
the guarantee the NCAA provides that the two teams on the field both meet its
standards of amateurism so that consumers who value that aspect of the product
can rest assured they are attending or watching a truly amateur product.
However, as with the PROs, the line is crossed when the NCAA’s
collective boycott rules prohibit alternative arrangements from reaching the
marketplace. Perhaps fans would relish more opportunities to watch a team of
college athletes employed by their university play a team of college athletes
meeting the existing amateurism rules (such as what happens annually when

41. See generally United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395
(WCC), 2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001).
42. See generally United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64 CIV. 3787, 1994 WL 901652
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994).
43. Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
44. Id. at 657–58.
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Army or Navy45 play Notre Dame),46 but the fact that the NCAA does not allow
schools other than the military academies to pay their athletes as employees
prohibits on-the-field and off-the-field competition between these two
compensation models, a prohibition that is itself prohibited under the ASCAP
and BMI decrees. As such, for the NCAA the plausible need for organic fruit
certification has turned into an unnecessary ban on non-organic fruit.
COLLEGE AND PROFESSIONAL ARE NOT ANTONYMS
Thus enters the second source of error—the confusion between college and
amateur. College sports would not vanish even if amateur college sports were
somehow to do so. As Rascher and Schwarz argued in 2000,47 and Schwarz
explained in 201148, these terms are not inherently synonymous. It is easy to
see that not all amateur sports are collegiate—any youth soccer league fits the
bill. It is less common to see paid collegiate sports, but this is because of rules
45. All college athletes at the three military academies (the United States Military Academy at West
Point, the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, and the United States Air Force Academy at
Colorado Springs) are employees of their respective branches of the service and receive monthly wages,
from which deductions are made. See, e.g., FAQ – Cadet Life, WESTPOINT, http://www.usma.edu/admissions/SitePages/FAQ_Life.aspx (last visited June 9, 2016).
A first-year cadet earns more than $900 a month, and the amount increases each
year.[] A portion of that cadet pay is deposited into a personal checking account. Another portion of cadet pay is deposited to a “Cadet Account” that is used to help a
cadet pay for expenses such as uniforms, books, a computer, activity fees, etc. Each
cadet pays a standard amount for laundry, dry cleaning, haircuts, tailoring services
and shoe repair. A cadet’s gross salary is subject to federal and state withholding
taxes and Social Security deductions.
Id.; see also Cadet Pay, U.S. AIR FORCE ACAD. (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.usafa.af.mil/AboutUs
/FactSheets/Display/tabid/1530/Article/428296/cadet-pay.aspx (“U.S. Air Force Academy cadets earn
$846 a month in basic pay. Cadet pay is disbursed by direct deposit to the cadet’s personal checking
account.”); Student Life: General Information, USNA, http://www.usna.edu/Student-Life/General-Information-for-Midshipmen.php (last visited June 9, 2016) (explaining that “Midshipmen pay is
$1027.20 monthly, from which laundry, barber, cobbler, activities fees, yearbook and other service
charges are deducted. Actual cash pay is $100 per month your first year, which increases each year
thereafter.”).
46. This year’s Notre Dame–Navy game was aired on NBC (the broadcast network) on October 10,
2015. See C.J. Prosise Scores 3 TDs as No. 15 Notre Dame Beats Navy, ESPN (Oct. 10, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/recap?gameId=400763584. The salaried employees of the Navy
lost to the unsalaried non-employees of Notre Dame, 24–41. See id. Notably, as of November 22,
2015, this was the Navy’s only loss for the season, but the Authors are unaware of any outrage that paid
employees are being allowed to compete against more standard amateur athletes.
47. See generally Rascher & Scwharz, supra note 8.
48. See generally Andy Schwarz, Excuses, Not Reasons: 13 Myths About (Not) Paying College
Athletes, SELECTED PROC. SANTA CLARA SPORTS L. SYMP., Sept. 2011, at 46.

SCHWARZ_VOLANTE FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

6/15/2016 4:39 PM

O’BANNON & FALLACY OF FRAGILE DEMAND

407

in question and the NCAA’s grip over intercollegiate sports. In those rare cases
where the NCAA does not govern, such as USA Cycling’s (USAC) Collegiate
Racing, there is no prohibition on professional cyclists participating as long as
they qualify as bona fide college students.49 USAC rules stipulate only a
minimum level of funding and do not define or enforce any restriction on
maximum compensation.50 The primary requirement is simply that the athlete
actually be in college.51 Schwarz explained that this actually creates four
possible options, not the false dichotomy of college or professional52:

College
Non-College

Capped In-Kind Payment
(“Amateur”)
Current NCAA
Popular
True Amateurs playing in the
park, Club Ultimate Frisbee,
post-collegiate Rugby, etc.
Not Popular

Market Rate Payment
(“Professional”)
My proposal
Likely to be Popular
NBA D-League and other
minor leagues.
Not Popular

The NCAA rules defining amateurism may be analogous to the idea of an
organic fruit certifier, but when the NCAA enforces those rules with economic
coercion, the analogy breaks down. If the industry needs a standard to define
amateurism, and if consumers demand teams that meet that standard, then
certification is sufficient to ensure their market demand is met. Instead, the
actual marketplace sees constant efforts by schools to push beyond those rules
(which the NCAA tends to call “major infractions”)53 and sees little decrease in
49. See 2012 USA CYCLING RULE BOOK arts 7A1(b), 7G3 (2012). Collegiate Cycling has a goal
of “[e]nabling elite riders to pursue an education while benefiting from development opportunities that
integrate with amateur and professional teams and national development programs[.]” Id. art
7A1(b).“Current and former professional cyclists, who otherwise satisfy the eligibility requirements of
these Rules, are allowed to compete in Collegiate Cycling Races.” Id. art 7G3.
50. See id. art 7B1(r).
Varsity Cycling Team means any USA Cycling Collegiate member club in good standing,
having submitted the appropriate Varsity application to USA Cycling proving that the Team employs
or is advised by at least one USAC-licensed coach, and also meets any three of the following four
requirements: (i) The Team is recognized as holding varsity status by the school with which it is
affiliated. (ii) The Team disburses at least $10,000 in scholarships to its athletes annually. (iii) The
Team attended any two of the four USA Cycling Collegiate National Championships in the previous
calendar year. (iv) The Team pays for Riders’ entry into Collegiate Cycling Races, so long as the
funding is not derived from team dues of any kind.
Id.
51. See id.
52. Schwarz, supra note 48, at 67.
53. For a searchable database of these major infractions, see Legislative Services Database - LSDBi,
NCAA.ORG, https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch (last visited June 9, 2016).
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demand with each example. If consumer demand is truly a function of
amateurism, then a rigorous standard setting and inspection regime, without the
need for collective boycott, would suffice. If there were truly a demand for
amateurism, then that consumer demand would be sufficient to prevent teams
from making the “quantum leap” that destroys demand, and the promise of a
rigorous certification and inspection (but not enforcement) would be all that is
needed to ensure against market collapse.
A simple mental experiment makes this clear. Assume (arguendo) demand
for Auburn football is, as the majority in the Ninth Circuit implicitly assumed,
a function of Auburn refraining from crossing some magical line such as COA.
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
In other words, assume (as above) that 𝑑𝑤 >0 for all w<=COA, and then
there is some as-yet unproven discontinuity, such that 𝐷(𝑤, 𝑞) = 0 for all w >
COA. As indicated by the functional notation D(w,q), demand is also assumed
to be a function of quality—that is, the evidence strongly suggests that fans will
pay more for a winning Auburn Tigers team than a losing one and networks will
more prominently broadcast winning Auburn games, all else equal. Now
assume the NCAA investigates allegations that Cecil Newton, father of
Heisman Trophy winner Cam Newton, received payment in exchange for his
son attending Auburn.54 Under the truth-in-labeling assumptions, Auburn
wants to maintain the label of amateur to tap into consumers’ demand for amateurism, but Auburn also wants to “cheat” by paying the elder Newton for the
services of the younger to improve quality without seeming to cross the threshold (w>COA). If the NCAA exposes the payment so that consumers are aware
that Newton received more than COA, (and if the assumptions about the consumer benefits of amateurism were true) demand for the Auburn product would
collapse, just as demand for faux-ganic fruit would collapse if the specific
brands in question were publicly revealed to be phony.55 There is no need to
fine or collectively boycott Auburn, because if the assumptions about demand
were true, the market would punish Auburn once the NCAA revealed the truth.
Instead, as many may have surmised, it is possible the revelation of Cecil
Newton having profited off the sweat of Cam’s brow would have had little or
𝑑𝐷(𝑤,𝑞)
no impact on demand for Auburn football. That is, it appears that
>0 for
𝑑𝑤
some values of w>COA, or perhaps even the level of pay has no impact on
demand, so that D = 𝑓(𝑞), rather than 𝑓(𝑤, 𝑞).56 In that case, if Alabama were
54. Per documents released by Auburn, this example is counter-factual: “The documents indicate
Newton’s father, Cecil Newton, and ex-Mississippi State player Kenny Rogers sought from $120,000
to $180,000 for the quarterback to sign with the Bulldogs out of junior college but didn't ask any other
school for money.” Auburn Releases Cam Newton Docs, ESPN (Nov. 5, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7190987/auburn-tigers-records-reveal-details-cam-newton-scandal.
55. One might say the metaphorical apple would hit Newton on the head.
56. Indeed, the idea that demand is itself increasing or decreasing in wages is contrary to all
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to choose (on its own) that it no longer wished to play against Auburn, the
antitrust laws would have little to say about such unilateral choices. On the
other hand, neither would the law prohibit Alabama from continuing to play
Auburn, even while maintaining amateurism or instead opting to adopt
payments similar to Auburn. If it did so, Alabama would be reacting like a
normal market participant, adopting additional expenses only because it felt it
would please its fans and thereby grow revenue. But such broadening of
consumer choice is made impossible by NCAA rules, which stifle that market
choice and mandate that Alabama boycott Auburn or else face a collective
boycott itself.
In both cases, then, what the law allows—collaboration among competitors
to ensure a product can exist and thrive—and what the law prohibits—collusion
above what is reasonable and necessary or which stifles rather than widens
competition—are a better match to a system in which the NCAA maintains a
standard definition of amateurism and conducts rigorous audits of schools
believed to be violating those standards (as it does now) to certify compliance
of those schools that wish to display the certified amateur sticker, but without
any enforcement mechanism other than denying that certification to those
schools that fail to meet the qualifications.
That is, that the NCAA could continue to define the “molten core” of its
product as it argued in the Ninth Circuit: “This is the molten core of the rule.
This says, this is a rule that simply says in the product that we have, athletes
cannot be paid, and we define what pay constitutes.” 57 But, this would leave it
to consumers to enforce that rule with their feet (by attending games played only
by certified amateur teams) and their eyeballs (by watching games played only
by certified amateur teams).
In such a system, consumers whose demand is truly driven by amateurism
will not be fooled into purchasing “shamateur” college football, but those
consumers for whom such arbitrary distinctions do not matter—much like those
who are fine with apples grown with pesticides—are able to purchase college
sports in a market in which restraints on payment (other than those self-enforced
by demand) do not exist. In that market, a star athlete might be paid to stay one
additional year in college rather than ride the pine in the NBA or NFL, but under
NCAA rules, that choice, for schools and for consumers of those school’s sport
products, is constrained.
There was a time during which the NCAA defined amateurism but had no
standard economics. For the NCAA’s argument to be true, we already have to suppose that demand
for college sports is sui generis because it hinges on wages in a way normal consumer demand does
not.
57. Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14:23.
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enforcement power. From 1906 (when the NCAA was founded) until 1948,58
the NCAA frequently described the aspirational goal of amateurism as it was
then defined (no scholarships at all) and left it to schools and conferences to
enforce such a rule. Few schools and conferences did, yet the sport thrived.
Again, in 1951 with the wake of the Sanity Code, the NCAA ceased enforcing
amateurism but demand remained steady.
Rather than widening consumer choice, in the way that organic labeling
rules do, the NCAA’s collective boycott perverts the idea of procompetitive
restraints by narrowing choice and stifling competition between compensation
systems. If the Ninth Circuit, or any court, seeks a truly less restrictive
alternative to a blanket prohibition on the production of non-amateur college
sports, a far simpler, far more competitive solution is to allow the NCAA its
labeling role, but to strip it of enforcement of what amounts to a price-fixing
cartel (or group boycott).
In some sense, the debate on a less restrictive alternative, on which
O'Bannon hinged (and on which Plaintiffs have now appealed) and with which
Jenkins v. NCAA and Alston v. NCAA also must grapple, is somewhat
superfluous.59 If the market truly wants amateurism, certified amateur sports
will sell themselves. If not, there is no economic justification to allow pricefixing to achieve such an outcome if the market outcome would be, as the majority in O’Bannon assumed, one in which athletes capture their full value.

58. Note that in oral arguments the NCAA argued that it imposed amateurism from its inception in
1906. This is factually false and likely reflects an attempt by the NCAA to push backwards the start of
its price fixing to make it seem more focal to college sports’ early success than it actually was. The
NCAA also failed to note it allows the exceptions for paid employees. See https://apps.oyez.org
/player/#/burger8/oral_argument_audio/194259 (last visited June 9, 2016).
59. See generally Jenkins v. NCAA, 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2015).

